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states. We might infer from Simon’s
books that he is skeptical of NATO’s
transformative capacity and truly does
view the evolution of civil-military relations as primarily a domestically generated phenomenon. This would be a
difficult conclusion to defend, however,
given that Simon himself points out
that NATO made the Czech-Slovak relationship much easier to manage after
the split than it otherwise would have
been. Beyond that single, very important insight, the reader is left wondering
whether the logic of NATO’s stabilizing
capacity could be extended elsewhere.
In all likelihood, NATO’s inclusiveness
has not only stabilized relations between states in Central Europe and
between Russia and former Soviet
satellites, but it also improved the quality of a range of domestic institutions
throughout the region. Speculating
about postcommunist Europe without
NATO’s engagement, one imagines a
historically vulnerable set of states with
all the domestic dysfunctions that accompany acute military insecurity. All
of the democratic adaptations that
NATO requires to improve the interface with its members and consolidate a
particular set of values would have been
the subject of protracted debate. Moreover, without NATO’s support, those
values, even in the most Westernoriented societies, might never have
prevailed. There is indeed evidence of
the contingent nature of democratic
civil-military relations in the Polish
case, where a series of crises and dissent
over the value of democratic control
delayed the subordination of the general staff to the Ministry of Defense. Although Hungary, Slovakia, and, to a
lesser extent, the Czech Republic continue to have problems in consolidating
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democratic civil-military relations, it
is worth asking where these countries
would be if NATO had never introduced the norm as a desirable and
functional feature of democratic
governance.
For those concerned with NATO’s impact on the region, Simon’s series is, of
course, an invaluable resource in understanding exactly what happened. Yet
one has to look further than Simon to
see the subtle, as well as the not-sosubtle, ways in which NATO has transformed the politics of postcommunist
Europe. Now would be a particularly
apt time for Simon to contribute to the
debate about whether NATO has salutary political effects, because as the strategic environment has worsened, the
United States in particular is manifesting less interest in the quality of democratic institutions in new member states
than in foreign policy support for wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although cultivating policy loyalty might be politically expedient, NATO could be
missing an opportunity afforded by
the transition’s political and institutional fluidity to facilitate reforms that
would not only improve the quality of
domestic governance but also help consolidate a widening democratic
community.
RACHEL EPSTEIN

Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver
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As the world steps farther away from
the Cold War, the evolving structure of
the international system continues to
fascinate informed citizens as well as
professional scholars. In this work,
Joyce Kaufman, professor of political
science at Whittier College, contributes
to the debate on the evolution and future of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly as the situation in the Balkans
confronted a post–Cold War (and expanding) NATO. In detailing the events
between the collapse of Soviet communism (1990) and the attack on the twin
towers (2001), the author makes a
forceful case for the need for a unified
NATO alliance that is willing to use
force if necessary to quell international
instabilities.
Kaufman’s effort is particularly helpful
in plotting the movement of theory into
practice in international relations.
While no one at NATO headquarters in
1990 suggested that the world had not
materially changed with the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the alliance’s premier strategists could only make reasonable
guesses about this “new world,” as they
drew up the alliance’s Strategic Concept
of 1991. It took the decade-long dissolution of the former Yugoslavia to force
alliance planners to appreciate the detailed complexities of this world.
In one sense, this book is merely a confirmation of much of the conventional
wisdom on diplomatic theory and the
operations of alliances. On numerous
occasions the author explicitly makes
the point that diplomatic threats without military power are in vain; collective decision making is tortured,
difficult, and slow; domestic politics intrude on the capacity to be statesmanlike; and the absence of a clear enemy
provides an inducement for an alliance
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to lose focus. However, as Kaufman
develops the story with names, personalities, and events, the reader can watch
these theories come to life.
No one expects that alliance strategy
would be made in a vacuum, and this
work clearly and persuasively shows
how constraints of domestic politics
must be factored into NATO politics.
Of particular interest to makers of
American foreign policy is Kaufman’s
documentation of how the United
States evolved from an attitude that the
Balkans was a “European problem” to
being the alliance’s most forceful advocate for military intervention.
This work’s principal flaw is that its
sources are almost exclusively official
NATO documents and interviews with
the people directly associated with
those documents. The story is told
from NATO’s viewpoint by someone
who spoke to insiders but was not herself a member. Unfortunately, this
provides the reader with a conventional, albeit well supported, interpretation of events.
However, this work’s positive attributes
overwhelm this shortcoming. This easyto-read historical account provides
significant value for the student of international affairs, because it documents a perfect contemporary test case
of how alliances evolve in the face of a
changing security environment. While
most pundits saw the Balkans as the
most likely spot for crisis and conflict
in Europe a decade ago, few would have
guessed that the NATO alliance would
have ultimately achieved such a preeminent role in its resolution. Indeed, just
prior to the signing of the London Declaration in 1990, numerous editorials
were suggesting that while NATO had
done an admirable job during the Cold
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War, we should make preparations to
“turn out the lights” in Brussels. Today,
as we find ourselves involved in a global
war on terrorism, the United States is
faced with a similar quandary. Does
NATO have the capacity, flexibility, and
will to engage the international terrorist
movement? Do our European allies
view the threat of terrorism as we do,
allowing for unity of action and willingness to use force? Do adversaries such
as al-Qa’ida allow the alliance to consider the entire globe its ultimate area
of responsibility? Can NATO, as
Madeleine Albright asked, move to a
more expansive concept of collective security? These questions may also require a decade to resolve, but Kaufman
previews the kind of difficulties the alliance is likely to encounter en route and
sheds some light on the ultimate
answers.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College
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The late Washington Post publisher
Philip Graham once said that journalism is the first draft of history. Todd S.
Purdum’s A Time of Our Choosing:
America’s War in Iraq, is the first draft
of the history of the U.S. occupation of
Iraq. Months before the Department
of Defense made the controversial decision to embed reporters within U.S.
units, Purdum was in Iraq reporting
the war.
The military’s major criticism of the
practice is that those assigned to the
same unit throughout the campaign
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would only have a “soda straw” view of
the war and would thus miss the big
picture. Others (primarily the media)
were concerned that reporters would
lose their objectivity once the shooting
started. However, Purdum’s professional work puts that argument to bed.
Early on, Purdum states that his task
was to “draw the work of my colleagues
into a single narrative.” In other words
his job was to bring those “soda straws”
together into a comprehensive and concise chronicle of the war. He certainly
has the necessary credentials for the
task—he has worked for the New York
Times for over twenty-five years and is a
former White House and diplomatic
correspondent.
Although Purdum’s narrative style is appealing, it is his ability to bring together
all the different material that makes this
book hard to put down. One reads of the
Bush administration’s intensive efforts
to convince a skeptical world of its case
for invasion and of the debate over UN
Security Council Resolution 1441. Divisions deepened as Secretary of State
Colin Powell and France’s charismatic
foreign minister Dominque de Villepin
both courted the United Nations and
public opinion. Meanwhile, military
planning proceeded at the Pentagon and
U.S. Central Command. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, expecting the
Iraq army to implode, deployed a force
much smaller than that of the nearly
550,000 troops in Operation DESERT
STORM. Their plan was a test of a new
American style of warfare that engaged
large numbers of special operations
forces and used highly accurate precision weapons and new technology in
the form of unmanned aerial vehicles.
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